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1003 
THE OCCUPY WALL STREET MOVEMENT AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: PROTESTERS PREOCCUPIED WITH THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT 
 
CRIMINAL COURT OF NEW YORK 
NEW YORK CITY 
People v. Nunez1 
(decided April 6, 2012) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendant Ronnie Nunez was arrested and charged with 
“[t]respass, [d]isorderly conduct, and [o]bstructing [g]overnmental 
[a]dministration in the [s]econd [d]egree.”2  Although the defendant 
moved to have the accusatory instrument against him suppressed and 
all charges dismissed, his motion was denied and the case went to tri-
al.3  The charges against the defendant were the result of his active 
participation in the Occupy Wall Street protests4 that took place with-
 
1 943 N.Y.S.2d 857 (Crim. Ct. 2012). 
2 Id. at 859 (citations omitted).  The defendant was charged with trespass for remaining 
inside Zuccotti Park after his legal right to be on the premises had been revoked.  Id. at 866.  
The defendant was charged with disorderly conduct due to his linking arms with other pro-
testors in an attempt to actively resist being removed from the park.  Id.  The defendant’s 
obstruction of governmental administration charges stemmed from his actively hindering the 
job of the NYPD in removing all protestors from Zuccotti Park.  Id. at 866-67. 
3 Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 859, 867 (“An accusatory instrument upon which the defendant 
may be held for trial must allege facts of an evidentiary character.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §100.15(3))).  The accusatory instrument in the case 
at hand stated that “deponent observed the defendant knowingly and unlawfully remain in-
side [Zuccotti Park] with a crowd of people after deponent observed and heard a NYPD Cap-
tain advise the group that they must leave the premises via bull-horn.”  Id. at 860 (alteration 
in original).  “As of [November 15, 2011 at or about 5:30 a.m.] permission and authority for 
any individual to remain at the location was withdrawn.”  Id. (alteration in original).  
4 The Occupy Wall Street protests officially began Saturday, September 17, 2011, taking 
over parts of Wall Street in New York City.  Colin Moynihan, Wall Street Protest Begins, 
With Demonstrators Blocked, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2011, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2011/09/17/wall-street-protest-begins-with-demonstrators-blocked/ [hereinafter Moynihan, 
Wall Street Protest Begins].  Those who participated in the protests believed that the exist-
ence of wealthy individuals and corporations within the United States undermined the demo-
cratic theory of government, and called for income equality.  Colin Moynihan, Wall Street 
1
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in Zuccotti Park.5  “The park is a Privately Owned Public Space 
(“POPS”) presently owned by Brookfield Properties (“Brookfield”) 
and is open for public use.”6  However, by mid-September of 2011, 
the park had become a base camp for the Occupy Wall Street protes-
tors, with individuals, including the defendant, going as far as erect-
ing “tents and other structures in the park.”7  In response to this, 
Brookfield instituted rules in an attempt to maintain order inside 
Zuccotti Park.8 
The defendant argued that his First Amendment9 rights were 
violated by Brookfield’s enactment of the rules and regulations gov-
erning Zuccotti Park, which among other things prohibited him from 
erecting tents within the park.10  The court held that owners of pri-
vately owned public spaces have the authority and right to establish 
rules and regulations for their property, so long as the restrictions of 
use are reasonable and intended to address a condition that would in-
terfere with the property’s intended use.11  Because the rules institut-
ed by Brookfield were formulated only to guarantee both that 
Zuccotti Park was used in its intended manner, and to “prevent the 
existence of unlawful conditions,”12 the court ruled that these rules 
were reasonable.13  Due to this finding, the court ultimately rejected 
the defendant’s First Amendment argument.14 
This Note will review the Criminal Court of the City of New 
York’s analysis of the First Amendment in regards to the Free Speech 
Clause of the United States Constitution. 
 
Protests Continue, With at Least 6 Arrested, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2011, 
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/wall-street-protests-continue-with-at-least-5-
arrested/ [hereinafter Moynihan, Wall Street Protests Continue]. 
5 Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 859. 
6 Id. at 861. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 862. 
9 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition to the Government for 
a redress of grievances.”). 
10 Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 864. 
11 Id. at 863-64. 
12 Id. at 864. 
13 Id. at 865. 
14 Id. at 864. 
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II. PEOPLE V. NUNEZ 
In late 2011, the Occupy Wall Street movement began and 
protestors established a base camp inside lower Manhattan’s Zuccotti 
Park.15  The park was built in 1968 with the intent that it would re-
main open twenty-four hours a day for its users to participate in and 
enjoy passive recreational activities.16  Aside from subjecting the 
owners of the park to liability, the Occupy Wall Street protest move-
ment severely hindered the ability of other users to enjoy Zuccotti 
Park in its intended manner.17 
After taking notice of the unsafe and unsanitary conditions 
that existed inside Zuccotti Park, the owner “promulgated rules of 
conduct”18 which were intended to ensure that lawful users could en-
joy the park and diminish the chance that Brookfield would be sub-
ject to liability.19  These rules prohibited: 
[C]amping and the erection of tents and other struc-
tures[,] . . . lying down on the ground . . . or benches[] 
. . . in a manner that unreasonably interferes with the 
use of benches, sitting areas or walkways by others[]   
. . . the placement of tarps or sleeping bags[,] . . . and   
. . . the storage or placement of personal property . . . 
in a manner that unreasonably interferes with the use 
of such areas by others.20 
Despite Brookfield’s best efforts, these regulations proved to 
be unsuccessful in aiding Brookfield in its attempts to reduce the in-
terference caused by the Occupy Wall Street protestors.21  This posed 
a great problem to Brookfield, because as private owners of public 
space, Brookfield was required follow all obligations set forth by the 
City Planning Commission.22  In this specific instance, the City Plan-
 
15 Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 861. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 862.  Zuccotti Park’s intended purpose was for that of passive recreation, and the 
conditions that had developed inside the park due to the Occupy Wall Street protestors hin-
dered this purpose.  Id. at 861-62.  The park had become a city within itself, containing a li-
brary, medical area, kitchen, and sanitation area.  Id. at 861. 
18 Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 862. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 864. 
21 Id. at 862. 
22 Id. at 863. 
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ning Commission required Zuccotti Park to remain “open and availa-
ble for public use 365 days per year.”23  With conditions as they were 
inside Zuccotti Park, Brookfield was unable to guarantee that the 
park would be fit for the public to use safely year round.24  Upon the 
request of Brookfield, officers of the New York City Police Depart-
ment entered Zuccotti Park in November of 2011 with orders to tem-
porarily evacuate all individuals that were inside so Brookfield could 
clean and maintain the property.25  Via flyers and megaphone an-
nouncements made by the NYPD, all individuals inside Zuccotti Park 
were directed to vacate the premises; the defendant, among other pro-
testors, actively refused to leave although he was given several hours 
to do so.26 
Although the defendant argued otherwise, the court held that 
“[privately owned public space] owners may establish rules of con-
duct, so long as these restrictions on the use of [a privately owned 
public space] are reasonable and designed to address nuisance or oth-
er conditions that would interfere with or are inconsistent with the in-
tended use of the [space] by the general public.”27  Owners of these 
spaces assume complete responsibility for any fines or injuries that 
occur on their property.28  As a result of this, Brookfield had absolute 
authority to enact regulations that prohibited the erection of tents and 
structures, lying on the ground or benches in a manner that interfered 
with the use of those benches for others to sit, unfolding sleeping 
bags, or storing personal property within the park.29  Because the reg-
 
23 Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 863. 
24 Id. at 862.  In late October of 2011, the New York City Fire Department issued 
Brookfield a Violation Order after determining that the conditions within the park presented 
a fire hazard, as there was no clear exit if there were to be an emergency.  Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. (“[M]any people, including the defendant, remained inside the park. . . .  [A] signifi-
cant number of those arrested, including the defendant, sat on the ground inside the park, 
linked arms with each other, and actively resisted the efforts of the police to separate and 
remove them.”). 
27 Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 863 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court specifically 
referenced temporary closings of a privately owned public space when making this determi-
nation.  Id. at 863-64. 
28 Id. at 863. 
29 Id.  New York City Zoning resolutions allowed for signs to be posted within Zuccotti 
Park informing its users that those activities inconsistent with the park’s normal use were 
prohibited: 
[T]o ensure a safe and comfortable environment for all public plaza us-
ers, a maximum of one prohibition sign or Rules of Conduct sign may be 
4
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ulations enacted by Brookfield prohibited only those activities that 
unreasonably interfered with the intended use of Zuccotti Park, the 
court held that the regulations were not in violation of the defendant’s 
First Amendment rights.30 
III. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. Does the Conduct Communicate: The Threshold 
First Amendment Question 
The central First Amendment issue in Nunez was whether the 
defendant’s erection of tents and other structures was expressive con-
duct classified as speech for First Amendment purposes.31  While the 
text of the First Amendment only refers explicitly to speech, it has 
been recognized that its protections are broad and encompass conduct 
that communicates.32 
However, not all conduct can be classified as expressive for 
First Amendment purposes.33  The leading case on this subject, and 
one which the court in Nunez relied heavily, is Spence v. Washing-
ton.34  In Spence, the appellant was arrested after he hung the United 
States flag upside down, adorned with a peace symbol made from 
black tape, out of the window of his Seattle apartment.35  The appel-
lant was charged under a Washington statute that prohibited individ-
uals from displaying flags containing any type of words, markings, or 
drawings.36  The peace symbol-adorned flag had a specific purpose: it 
was created in order to protest the recent Kent State University kill-
 
located within the public plaza . . . such signs shall not prohibit behav-
iors that are consistent with the normal public use of the plaza such as 
lingering, eating, drinking of non alcoholic beverages or gathering in 
small groups. 
Id. at 864 (alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. ZONING RES. § 37-50). 
30 Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 864, 866. 
31 Id. at 864 (“The defendant claim[ed] that he and others were exercising their first 
amendment right by setting up the tents and tarps.”). 
32 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (recognizing that conduct may be 
“sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments”). 
33 Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 865. 
34 418 U.S. 405 (1974). 
35 Id. at 406. 
36 Id. at 406-07. 
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ings and the American invasion of Cambodia.37  Faced with the issue 
of determining what types of expressive conduct would fall within 
the parameters of the First Amendment, the Court developed a two-
prong test: first, there must be the intent to convey a particularized 
message, and second, when considering the surrounding circum-
stances, there must be a great likelihood that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it.38  The Court stressed the im-
portance of the context surrounding the questioned conduct, which 
means that conduct could be constitutionally protected in some in-
stances, while that same conduct could be denied those protections in 
others.39 
B. Is the Restriction Targeted at the Message Being 
Conveyed? 
1. United States v. O’Brien 
Once the conduct is determined to be expressive, the next 
question that must be asked is whether the restriction is targeted at 
the message.  If the answer to this question is no, the proper analyti-
cal framework is that which was set forth in United States v. 
O’Brien.
40
  For a regulation to withstand the O’Brien test, the gov-
ernment must have a “sufficiently important governmental interest in 
regulating . . . [that can] justify incidental limitations on First 
Amendment freedoms.”41  In O’Brien, the Court was faced with the 
 
37 Id. at 408.  The defendant took the stand and testified in his own defense stating, “I felt 
there had been so much killing and that this was not what America stood for.  I felt that the 
flag stood for America and I wanted people to know that I thought America stood for peace.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
38 Spence, 418 U.S. at 409-12. 
39 Id. at 410. 
In this case, appellant’s activity was roughly simultaneous with and 
concededly triggered by the Cambodian incursion and the Kent State 
tragedy, also issues of great public moment.  A flag bearing a peace 
symbol and displayed upside down by a student today might be inter-
preted as nothing more than bizarre behavior, but it would have been 
difficult for the great majority of citizens to miss the drift of appel-
lant’s point at the time he made it. 
Id. (citation omitted).  
40 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
41 Id. at 376. 
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issue of an individual having been arrested under a newly amended 
federal statute that imposed criminal liability if anyone knowingly 
destroyed, altered, or forged his or her Selective Service registration 
certificate.42  In violation of this statute, the defendant publicly 
burned his Selective Service registration in front of a large crowd on 
the steps of the South Boston Courthouse.43  While O’Brien conceded 
the fact that he had burned his registration card, he claimed his con-
duct was protected under the First Amendment, arguing that his ac-
tions were done with a communicative purpose: to cause others to 
follow his antiwar beliefs.44  Even though the Court assumed that 
O’Brien’s conduct was sufficiently expressive to bring the First 
Amendment into play, it upheld O’Brien’s conviction because the 
government demonstrated a substantial interest, the statute was a nar-
row means to protect that interest, and the non-communicative aspect 
of O’Brien’s conduct frustrated the government’s interest.
45
 
The Court rejected the respondent’s argument that the purpose 
of the statute was to restrict free speech.46  It concluded that the stat-
ute was content neutral, did not attempt to distinguish between con-
duct that occurred in private or public forums, and more importantly, 
it did not “punish only destruction engaged in for the purpose of ex-
pressing views.”47  When analyzing regulations placed upon commu-
nicative conduct which are not directed at the message, the govern-
ment must be able to point to a “sufficiently important governmental 
interest in regulating the nonspeech element”48 that is within its con-
trol and distinct from “the suppression of free expression.”49  Regard-
 
42 Id. at 369-70.  These Selective Service registration certificates served an important pur-
pose at the time of this case: to provide the government, pursuant to the Universal Military 
Training and Service Act, with pertinent draft information.  Id. at 372-73.  The registration 
cards contained the individual’s name, the date he or she registered for the draft, his or her 
birth date, address, and a physical description, among other important identifying infor-
mation.  Id. at 373. 
43 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 369.  The conduct that the statute prohibited did not necessarily 
have any connection with speech.  Id. at 375. 
44 Id. at 370 (“[O’Brien] stated in argument . . . that he burned the certificate publicly to 
influence others . . . ‘so that other people would reevaluate their positions with Selective 
Service, with the armed forces, and reevaluate their place in the culture of today, to hopeful-
ly consider my position.’ ”). 
45 Id. at 376-77. 
46 Id. at 376-77. 
47 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 375-76, 383. 
48 Id. at 376. 
49 Id. at 377. 
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less of the government’s cited interest, if the restriction impedes upon 
First Amendment freedoms any more than is necessary to further that 
interest, it will be not upheld.50  Therefore, O’Brien established a 
two-part test for evaluating restrictions based on symbolic conduct or 
speech: (1) the government must have an important purpose in regu-
lating the speech that is not related to the message, and (2) the impact 
on the communication can be no greater than is necessary to achieve 
the government’s purpose.51 
The Court in O’Brien upheld the statute, noting that Congress 
had pointed to several justifications for enacting it, including that the 
certificates proved the individual was registered for the draft and that 
the certificates allowed the draft system to run more efficiently since 
individuals always had their pertinent information on hand.52  These 
justifications were unrelated to the suppression of expression; in oth-
er words, O’Brien was not punished for the communicative nature of 
his conduct.53  When the restriction is not targeted at the message be-
ing conveyed, the courts will analyze it using these less stringent 
standards than if the restriction were targeted at the message.54 
2. Texas v. Johnson 
In instances where the restriction is targeted at the message 
being conveyed, a more exacting standard of strict scrutiny is ap-
plied.55  In Texas v. Johnson,
56
 the Court was presented with another 
issue of communicative conduct and the First Amendment.57  John-
son was a member of a political demonstration that took place during 
the Republican National Convention in Dallas in 1984.58  Although 
 
50 Id. 
51 See generally id. 391 U.S. 367. 
52 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 378-80 (stating that Congress had “establish[ed] beyond doubt” 
that it had a legitimate interest in preventing the destruction of the Selective Service registra-
tion certificates). 
53 Id. at 382. 
54 Id.  The Court compared the case at hand to one in which the statute at issue intended to 
punish those “who expressed their ‘opposition to organized government[],’ ” which in other 
words, established the fact that the restriction was targeted at the message being conveyed.  
Id.  
55 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989). 
56 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
57 Id. at 406. 
58 Id. at 399. 
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the respondent’s role in the protest was minimal, at one point he “un-
furled [an] American flag, doused it with kerosene, and set it on 
fire.”59  While the flag burned, the respondent chanted “America, the 
red, white, and blue, we spit on you.”60  Johnson was convicted under 
a Texas statute that made it a criminal offense to desecrate the Amer-
ican flag, which the State justified by its interest in preserving the 
flag as a national symbol of unity and peace.61  However, the Court 
concluded that the less stringent O’Brien standard did not apply be-
cause the State had not asserted an interest that was unrelated to the 
suppression of expression.62 
The Court rejected the State’s argument that the statute fur-
thered its interest in preserving the “physical integrity of the flag.”63  
Because the text of the statute itself stated that burning was the pre-
ferred method of disposal for a flag that is no longer fit for display, 
this allowed the Court to conclude that the statute was not punishing 
the general act of flag burning.64  Rather, the statute intended to pun-
ish those who burned the flag as a means of conveying a particular 
message.65  Thus, the regulation was content-based and subject to the 
rigorous standard of strict scrutiny, described by the Court as “the 
most exacting scrutiny.”66  Pursuant to this test, “[a] law directed at 
the communicative nature of conduct must, like a law directed at 
speech itself, be justified by the substantial showing of need that the 
First Amendment requires.”67 
 
59 Id.  Other protestors engaged in activities such as spray-painting, overturning plants, 
and staging “die-ins” to highlight the costs of nuclear warfare.  Id.  Johnson played no role in 
these activities.  Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399. 
60 Id. at 399 (internal quotation marks omitted).  There was little to no discussion by the 
Court of whether or not Johnson’s conduct was communicative in nature for First Amend-
ment purposes; it accepted the lower courts’ determination that it was based on the two-
prong test developed by the Court in Spence.  Id. at 405-06. 
61 Id. at 400. 
62 Id. at 407 (“If we find that an interested asserted by the State simply is not implicated 
on the facts before us, we need not ask whether O’Brien’s test applies .”). 
63 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 411-12. 
66 Id. at 412 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 485 (1988) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
67 Id. at 406 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence 
v. Watts, 703 F.2d 586, 622 (1983)). 
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C. Time, Place, or Manner Restrictions 
When the challenged restriction is not targeted at the message 
being conveyed, it must be analyzed under the standard for evaluat-
ing time, place, or manner restrictions.68  These time, place, or man-
ner restrictions must be content-neutral, narrowly tailored, and leave 
open ample alternative channels for communication.69  This test is the 
functional equivalent of the O’Brien test previously described.70 
1. Content-Neutrality 
In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,71 the Court 
upheld a regulation enacted by the National Park Service that prohib-
ited camping in parks, unless done in specified campground areas.72 
The regulation itself stated that whether an activity constituted camp-
ing would be determined objectively, and therefore the intent of the 
individuals engaging in the activity was irrelevant.73  Respondent was 
the organizer of a demonstration that was to take place within two 
parks that were under the regulation of the National Park Service, 
which would highlight the “plight of the homeless.”74 The respondent 
requested permission for the demonstrators to sleep in the tents they 
planned to erect, but the Park Service denied the requested, referring 
 
68 Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). 
69 Id. 
70 Compare id. at 298 (“[T]he four factor standard of United States v. O’Brien for validat-
ing a regulation of expressive conduct, . . . is little, if any, different from the standard applied 
to time, place, or manner restrictions.”), with O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (“[A] government 
regulation is sufficiently justified if it . . . furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest . . . unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction 
on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
interest.”). 
71 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
72 Id. at 289-90.  For these purposes, camping was defined as “the use of park land for liv-
ing accommodation purposes such as sleeping activities, or making preparations to sleep . . . 
or using any tents or . . . other structure . . . for sleeping.”  Id. at 290-91.  The government 
cited its substantial interest in maintaining the capitol’s parks in an attractive and safe condi-
tion for all that wished to use them as its purpose in enacting the regulation.  Id. at 296. 
73 Id. at 291.  Had the intent of the individuals been relevant to making a determination of 
whether there was a violation of the statute, the regulation would likely have been classified 
much differently, perhaps as one that was aimed at the suppression of speech, and would 
have been analyzed under strict scrutiny, instead of the less stringent O’Brien time, place, 
and manner standards, which are more akin to intermediate scrutiny.  See Johnson, 491 U.S. 
at 407. 
74 Clark, 468 U.S. at 291-92. 
10
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to the regulations that prohibited camping within National Park 
grounds.75  While the Court conceded that sleeping in the tents was 
communicative in nature when considered as a whole with the rest of 
the demonstration, it declared that the First Amendment is not an av-
enue that individuals may use to express views without limitation.76  
Concluding that the ban on camping was not related to the suppres-
sion of speech, the Court analyzed it under the reasonable time, place, 
or manner restriction standards.77  The National Park Service regula-
tion was upheld as satisfying all three requirements: there was no is-
sue as to the neutrality of the regulation; the demonstrators were still 
permitted to carry on with their demonstration in its intended form 
less the sleeping (which enabled them to convey their intended mes-
sage); and the regulation was narrowly tailored to serve the govern-
ment’s interest, as it permitted the demonstrators to sleep inside the 
specified campground areas.78 
2. Narrowly Tailored 
In addition to being content neutral, time, place, or manner re-
strictions must also be narrowly tailored.  In Frisby v. Schultz,79 the 
Court definitively stated that regulations would be considered “nar-
rowly tailored if [they] target[] and eliminate[] no more than the ex-
act source of the ‘evil’ [they] seek[] to remedy.”80  Appellees were 
individuals who opposed abortion and had organized a group of pick-
eters to convey this message in front of the homes of two doctors 
who performed such procedures.81  In response to residents who had 
been disturbed by the picketing, the Town of Brookfield, Wisconsin, 
 
75 Id. at 292. 
76 Id. at 293, 296 (“[W]e seriously doubt that the First Amendment requires the Park Ser-
vice to permit a demonstration [in the parks] involving a 24-hour vigil.”). 
77 Id. at 294.  The Court expressly rejected that argument that expressive conduct could 
not be regulated through time, place, or manner restrictions, and stated that the fact that con-
duct was intended to convey a message had no impact on the validity of such First Amend-
ment restrictions.  Id. at 294-95; see generally Matter of Waller v. City of New York, 933 
N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (holding that the questioned restrictions were content neutral, 
and therefore valid as time, place, or manner restrictions even though they were enacted after 
the proposed communicative activity began). 
78 Clark, 468 U.S. at 295-96. 
79 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
80 Id. at 485. 
81 Id. at 476. 
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subsequently implemented a ban on residential picketing that was in-
tended to protect and preserve the privacy and tranquility of the 
home.82  The Court upheld the ban as being narrowly tailored, and 
therefore a valid time, place, or manner restriction.83  The Court 
adopted a limited reading of the ordinance, finding that it applied on-
ly to picketing in front of a single residence or dwelling.84  Adopting 
this limited reading permitted the Court to further conclude that indi-
viduals who wished to picket had sufficient alternative channels in 
which to do so.85  These alternative channels of communication in-
cluded picketing on a marked route through the residential neighbor-
hood, going door-to-door, or even contacting residents of the town by 
regular mail or telephone.86 
While the time, place, or manner restrictions must be narrow-
ly tailored, there is no requirement that they be the least restrictive 
means available.87  In United States v. Albertini,88 the respondent was 
convicted under a federal statute that made it unlawful for any indi-
vidual who had previously been barred from a military base by its 
commanding officer to reenter.89  The respondent had received a “bar 
letter” after he committed acts of vandalism on Hickam Air Base 
(“Hickam”).90  He had entered the base under the pretense of deliver-
ing a letter, but actually intended to destroy secret documents by 
dousing them in animal blood.91  Some years later, during an open 
house at Hickam that was advertised as permitting public access to 
the base, the respondent entered with the intent to engage in a 
demonstration against the “nuclear arms race.”92  Based on these ac-
 
82 Id. at 476-77.  The picketing ban read in pertinent part: “It is unlawful for any person to 
engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of any individual in the Town 
of Brookfield.”  Id. at 477 (quotation marks omitted).  Additionally, the ban’s purpose was 
included in its text, which left no room for interpretation as to the town’s intentions.  Frisby, 
487 U.S. at 477. 
83 Id. at 483. 
84 Id.  The Court was also influenced by the statements of a town representative, who de-
clared that the view of picketing they adopted in terms of the ban was one in which the 
“picketing [was] directed at a single residence.”  Id. 
85 Id. at 483-84. 
86 Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484. 
87 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789-90 (1989). 
88 472 U.S. 675 (1985). 
89 Id. at 677. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 678 
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tions, respondent was charged with violating the above-mentioned 
statute.93 
The respondent argued that his exclusion from Hickam under 
the statute violated his First Amendment rights.94  The Court rejected 
this argument.95  First, the Court concluded that the statute properly 
furthered the government’s substantial interest in ensuring the securi-
ty of military bases by preventing the entry of individuals who had 
previously demonstrated that they posed a risk to security.96  The nar-
rowness of the statute was debated, as the respondent argued that a 
policy of general exclusion of those whom had received bar letters 
was “greater than [was] essential to the furtherance of Government 
interests in the security of military installations.”97  However, the 
Court rejected this argument as well, stating that “[t]he First 
Amendment does not bar application of a neutral regulation that inci-
dentally burdens speech merely because a party contends that allow-
ing an exception in the particular case will not threaten important 
government interests.”98  Therefore, the narrowness of blanket time, 
place, or manner regulations must be analyzed in regard to the regula-
tion’s general applicability.99  Most importantly, these types of re-
strictions are not invalid “simply because there is some imaginable 
alternative that might be less burdensome on speech.”100  Therefore, 
the only consideration taken into account when determining the nar-
row tailoring of the regulation is whether or not it “promotes a sub-
stantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively 
absent the regulation.”101 
Similarly, in Ward v. Rock Against Racism102 the Supreme 
Court expressly rejected the contention that time, place, or manner 
restrictions have to be the least restrictive means to be declared val-
id.103  After fielding a number of complaints from unhappy residents 
 
93 Albertini, 472 U.S. at 679. 
94 Id. at 677. 
95 Id. at 688-89. 
96 Id. at 689. 
97 Id. at 688. 
98 Albertini, 472 U.S. at 688. 
99 Id. at 688-89. 
100 Id. at 689. 
101 Id. 
102 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
103 Id. at 798. 
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nearby due to an on-going excessive sound problem from a concert 
venue, the City of New York decided to invoke a self-regulated 
monitoring system.104  Under this system, the City would monitor the 
sound being emitted from the theater during concerts and other 
events.105  The respondent, Rock Against Racism, was the sponsor of 
a series of rock concerts that were held in the theater within Central 
Park, and was denied permits due to its prior history of excessive 
noise.106  Citing its interest in controlling noise levels in order to 
avoid intrusion onto the surrounding residential areas, the City agreed 
to supply equipment and hire a sound technician to monitor the sound 
levels at all events.107 
Of the three elements of the standard for evaluating time, 
place, or manner restrictions, the one at issue in Ward was whether or 
not the regulation was narrowly tailored to serve an important gov-
ernmental interest.108  It was not the City’s interest in maintaining 
reasonable sound levels that was challenged, but rather its method of 
doing so.109  The Court articulated its faith in governments enacting 
these time, place, or manner restrictions, and allowed for deference to 
be granted to them.110  While regulations cannot be enacted without 
regard to First Amendment rights, once a manner of promoting an 
acknowledged substantial governmental interest has been endorsed, 
the Court will be reluctant to overstep this determination, even if it 
finds that the interest could be promoted in an alternative, or even 
less constricting way.111 
 
104 Id. at 785. 
105 Id. at 785.  If the City determined that the sound being emitted from the theater was 
excessive, the permit to use the theater would be revoked.  Id. 
106 Ward, 491 U.S. at 784-85 (“[T]he city declined to grant an event permit, citing its 
problems with noise and crowd control at RAR’s previous concerts.  The city suggested 
some other city-owned facilities as alternative sites for the concert.”). 
107 Id. at 787, 792. 
108 Id. at 796.  The Court quickly accepted the fact that the regulation was content-neutral, 
as the government’s purpose of controlling sound to maintain peacefulness was not related 
“to the content of expression.”  Id. at 791. 
109 Id. at 797. 
110 Ward, 491 U.S. at 800 (“The validity of [time, place, or manner] regulations does not 
turn on a judge’s agreement with the responsible decisionmaker concerning the most appro-
priate method for promoting significant government interests.” (alteration in original) (quot-
ing United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985))).  
111 Id. at 800. 
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3. Strength of the Government’s Interest 
Maintaining areas that are used by the public in a safe and ac-
cessible manner has generally been accepted as a substantial govern-
mental interest.112  For example, in Thomas v. Chicago Park Dis-
trict,113 the Court upheld a Chicago Park District (“Park District”) 
ordinance that required those wishing to assemble, picnic, conduct a 
parade, or engage in any other type of activity with greater than fifty 
individuals inside the parks to obtain permits.114  Petitioners had ap-
plied for multiple permits, some of which were granted and some of 
which were denied, to hold rallies inside the Park District’s parks to 
vocalize their beliefs that marijuana should be legalized.115  The ordi-
nance was uniformly applied to all individuals seeking to obtain per-
mits to gather inside the parks, which left no question as to whether 
or not it was related to the expression of suppression.116  Additional-
ly, the Park District’s goals in enacting the ordinance were not related 
to the communicative nature of the conduct; rather, it wanted the abil-
ity to maintain its facilities in a manner that best suited the general 
public and other users.117  Similar to the Court’s rationale in Clark, 
the Court in Thomas refused to invalidate the ordinance based upon 
this one individual instance of the Park District denying a permit.118  
Rather, the Court took into account the generalized effect the ordi-
nance had on permitting the Park District to further its governmental 
interest, along with the rights of others who wished to use the 
parks.119 
 
112 See Clark, 468 U.S. at 299. 
113 534 U.S. 316. 
114 Id. at 318.  The Chicago Park District was in charge of operating the public parks, and 
was vested with the authority to promulgate all necessary rules and regulations to do so.  Id. 
115 Id. at 319-20.  
116 Id. at 322 (“Indeed, the ordinance . . . is not even directed to communicative activi-
ty . . . but rather to all activity conducted in a public park.  The picnicker and soccer player, 
no less than the political activist or parade marshal, must apply for a permit . . . .”). 
117 Id. 
118 Thomas, 534 U.S. at 322; see Clark, 468 U.S. at 297 (“If the Government has a legiti-
mate interest in ensuring that the National Parks are adequately protected, which we think it 
has, and if the parks would be more exposed to harm without the sleeping prohibition than 
with it, the ban is safe from invalidation under the First Amendment as a reasonable regula-
tion of the manner in which a demonstration may be carried out.”). 
119 Thomas, 534 U.S. at 324-25.  Important to the Court’s determination was the fact that 
the ordinance was also geared toward granting all individuals a fair opportunity to hold their 
parade, picnic, etc., it was essentially a first come, first served operation.  Id. at 324. 
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4. Governmental Discretion 
Another important requirement of time, place, or manner re-
strictions that was highlighted by the Court in Thomas is that they 
must “contain adequate standards to guide the official’s decision and 
render it subject to effective judicial review.”120  The Park District’s 
ordinance in Thomas contained various reasons that must be estab-
lished before denying a permit, including whether the proposed use 
presented a danger to employees or if the individual had violated a 
previously issued permit.121  This element of the ordinance played an 
important role in the Court’s determination to uphold it, as it elimi-
nated concerns that permits could be denied based solely upon the re-
quested use or beliefs of the individual or organization.122  These 
types of guidelines present in time, place, or manner restrictions do 
not necessarily require steadfast adherence so long as the departure 
from the system is only for the purposes of furthering the cited gov-
ernmental interest.123 
5. Tying It All Together 
In Lubavitch Chabad House, Inc. v. Chicago,124 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit dismissed Lubavitch 
Chabad House’s claim that under the First Amendment it was entitled 
to display a structure of a Chanukah menorah in a public space.125  
City regulations prohibited both private and public actors of all reli-
gious denominations from erecting structures in public areas to pre-
vent the disruption of the flow of pedestrian traffic.126  These regula-
tions were upheld as reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions.127  
All of the requirements for a valid time, place, or manner restriction 
were present.128  First, the regulation was content neutral: it prohibit-
 
120 Id. at 323. 
121 Id. at 324. 
122 Id. (“These grounds are reasonably specific and objective, and do not leave the deci-
sion ‘to the whim of the administrator.’ ” (quoting Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 
505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992))). 
123 Thomas, 534 U.S. at 325. 
124 917 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1990). 
125 Id. at 342-43. 
126 Id. at 342. 
127 Id. at 346. 
128 Id. at 346-47. 
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ed the erection of all structures in public areas by any group, religious 
or not; it did not just single out those of the Jewish faith.129  Second, 
the regulation was designed to prevent the obstruction of pedestrian 
traffic and use of the airport; by prohibiting the erection of structures 
that would impede traffic, this problem was remedied, which showed 
that the regulation was narrowly tailored.130  Finally, individuals were 
left with alternatives through which they could communicate their be-
liefs, such as passing out pamphlets or placing signs in areas of the 
airport that would not interfere with pedestrians.131  The court also 
declared there was no constitutional right to “erect . . . structure[s] on 
public property.”132  The court stated that the “Constitution neither 
provides, nor has it ever been construed to mandate, that any person 
or group be allowed to erect structures at will.”133  To recognize the 
erection of structures as “speech” protected by the First Amendment 
would produce congestion and disorder among public places, because 
allowing one group of individuals to erect a structure would neces-
sarily follow that all others must be permitted to do so as well.134 
IV. APPLICATION TO NUNEZ 
A. Does the Conduct Communicate? 
The Criminal Court of the City of New York in Nunez held 
that the erection of tents and camping inside Zuccotti Park could not 
be considered sufficiently expressive for the purposes of the First 
Amendment.135  While the court relied upon Spence in making its de-
termination, there is room for argument that the outcome should have 
been otherwise.136  As noted, the two-prong Spence test requires that 
there be intent to convey a particular message, and a great likelihood 
 
129 Lubavitch, 917 F.2d at 342. 
130 Id. at 346.  The court also rejected the argument that the regulations had to be the least 
restrictive means available.  Id. 
131 Id. at 342-43. 
132 Id. at 347. 
133 Lubavitch, 917 F.2d at 347. 
134 Id. 
135 Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 865. 
136 Id. 
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that those who view the conduct would understand the message.137  
Those involved with the Occupy Wall Street protest certainly had the 
intent to convey a message with their actions, and satisfied the first 
prong of the Spence test, as the foundation of the protest was to high-
light their beliefs regarding income inequality in America.138  As of 
September 2011, the month the Occupy Wall Street protests began, 
the national unemployment rate was 9.0%, which of the State of New 
York was 8.3%, and New York City was above the national average, 
with a rate of 9.1%.139  These statistics help bolster the argument that 
the second prong of the Spence test, which requires that there be a 
strong likelihood that the message would be perceived by those who 
viewed it, was also satisfied by the protestors setting up tents within 
Zuccotti Park.140  Using a totality of the circumstances approach, it 
would seem highly likely that residents of a city that maintained an 
unemployment rate higher than that of the national average would 
easily correlate individuals sleeping in tents to homelessness and 
therefore the country's income gap.141  While the court rejected the 
assertion that the erection of tents and camping within the park was 
communicative conduct and therefore afforded First Amendment pro-
tections, it did not articulate its rationale in making this determina-
tion, but merely concluded that under the Spence test, “erecting tents 
and other structures in Zuccotti Park did not qualify as protected 
speech and there is no reason to conclude that camping in [the park] 
conveyed any particular message.”142 
B. Is the Restriction Targeted at the Message Being 
Conveyed? 
Irrespective of the court’s determination that the questioned 
conduct was not communicative, it seems as though the court proper-
ly held that Brookfield’s rules and regulations were valid as time, 
place, and manner restrictions.143  As required under this standard, the 
 
137 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11. 
138 Moynihan, Wall Street Protest Begins, supra note 4. 
139 N.Y.S. DEP’T OF LABOR: PRESS RELEASE ARCHIVE (2012). 
140 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11; Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 861. 
141 Spence, 418 U.S. at 410. 
142 Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 865. 
143 Id. at 865. 
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regulations were not related to the suppression of expression.144 
1. Content Neutrality 
Arguably, a fact that may weaken the argument that the court 
in Nunez made a proper determination regarding the intent of the re-
striction is the recognition that the restrictions were enacted after the 
Occupy Wall Street protests began, and there was no mention of any 
other individuals pitching tents in the park during this time period.145  
This could mean that the restriction was indeed targeted at the mes-
sage the protestors intended to convey.146  If this determination were 
made, Brookfield’s restrictions would not be analyzed under the 
standard for time, place, or manner restrictions, but rather, under the 
strict scrutiny standards set forth by the Court in Johnson for content-
based restrictions.147  However, this argument was expressly rejected 
in Matter of Waller v. City of New York.148  The facts of Matter of 
Waller stem from the same Occupy Wall Street protest and Zuccotti 
Park situation as do those of Nunez.149  In Waller, the court concluded 
that the mere fact that the regulations were enacted after the conduct 
occurred is not conclusive that they were directed at the suppression 
of expression; so long as there is a legitimate state or governmental 
interest to support the regulations, they will generally be upheld as 
valid time, place, or manner restrictions.150 
Furthermore, as long as there is a sufficient governmental in-
terest, subsequently enacted time, place, or manner restrictions can be 
content-neutral.151  This was satisfied in Nunez, as Brookfield’s re-
strictions prohibited any individuals from erecting tents, sleeping in 
the park, or lying across the park benches, contrary to having prohib-
ited only members of the Occupy Wall Street protest.152 
 
144 Clark, 468 U.S. at 295; Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 864 (“There exists no basis to con-
clude that Brookfield’s prohibitions were applied to the defendant and other members of Oc-
cupy Wall Street because of any disagreement with their message.”). 
145 See generally Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d 857. 
146 Id. 
147 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412, 414. 
148 933 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup. Ct. 2011). 
149 See supra text accompanying note 4. 
150 Waller, 933 N.Y.S.2d at 544-54. 
151 Id. at 544. 
152 Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 864-66. 
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2. Narrow Tailoring 
Time, place, and manner restrictions also require that the reg-
ulation be narrowly tailored, which can be satisfied by ensuring that it 
eliminates only the conduct or speech that is obstructing the govern-
mental interest.153  In Nunez it was easy to see how Brookfield’s 
regulations achieved this.  To establish its important governmental 
interest, Brookfield cited its responsibility in maintaining its property 
and keeping the park in a condition safe for others to use.154  There 
was no question as to whether this was a sufficient governmental in-
terest, as the same purpose was accepted by the Supreme Court in 
Clark.155  The Court in Clark recognized that the government does in 
fact have a legitimate interest in protecting National Parks.156  Alt-
hough the park in Nunez was not a national park, the same rationale 
for allowing Brookfield to protect private property applies: the parks 
are intended for use by the general public, and the public has a right 
to use the property in safe and unhazardous conditions.157 
Further, the evacuation order in Nunez was only temporary; 
once Brookfield had returned its property to a safe and accessible 
condition, those who wished to use the park in its intended use would 
immediately be permitted to re-enter.158  Even though the prohibition 
against camping and tents inside the park was permanent, this easily 
furthered Brookfield’s interest in maintaining its property in a way 
that prevented unsafe conditions.159  Brookfield had allowed the use 
of tents, camping, and lying on benches inside its property until it 
discovered that permitting these activities posed a great risk of danger 
to other uses of the park, and even to those engaging in the subse-
quently prohibited activities.160  Once it was determined that these ac-
tivities impeded Brookfield’s ability to promote its interest, the chal-
lenged regulations were enacted.161  This is in compliance with the 
 
153 Frisby, 487 U.S. at 485. 
154 Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 864. 
155 Clark, 468 U.S. at 296. 
156 Id. at 297. 
157 Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 864. 
158 Id. at 863. 
159 Id. at 865-66. 
160 Id. at 861-864. 
161 Id. at 863.  Previously, camping and setting up tents had been permitted inside Zuccotti 
Park; it was not until after Brookfield saw the dangerous conditions inside its property, and 
the FDNY and NYPD declared that these conditions represented a fire hazard, a danger to 
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requirement from the Court in Albertini that the regulations must be 
found to promote a substantial government interest that would not be 
achieved as effectively without the regulation.162  Brookfield was un-
able to promote its interest absent the regulations.
163
 
3. Alternative Channels of Communication 
Although the court in Nunez did not suggest any alternative 
methods for the protestors to convey their message, Brookfield’s re-
strictions did leave the defendant and the others with other means to 
do so.164  The defendant could have, for example, distributed fliers 
containing his message to other individuals using the park, or he him-
self could have remained in the park, even sitting on the benches with 
a sign, so long as he did not interfere with Zuccotti Park’s intended 
use.165 
V. CONCLUSION 
While First Amendment freedoms are tremendously important 
to the history of American society, the rights conferred by the First 
Amendment are not absolute.166  As the foregoing discussion illus-
trates, the rights protected by the First Amendment need to be har-
monized with the government’s interest in performing its duties.  The 
tests developed by the Supreme Court to analyze speech restrictions 
seem to have struck the right balance.  The government cannot re-
strict an individual’s First Amendment rights to stifle an intended 
message; rather it must pass the rigorous standards of strict scrutiny 
to do so.167  Even when dealing with restrictions on speech or expres-
sive conduct that are not targeted at the message, the government still 
must express a sufficiently important interest in suppressing that 
 
life, and a general barrier to maintaining its property in a safe manner did Brookfield enact a 
regulation to prohibit them.  Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 862. 
162 Albertini, 472 U.S. at 689. 
163 Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 862. 
164 Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484. 
165 Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 864. 
166 See Thomas, 534 U.S. at 320.  The First Amendment was enacted after the implemen-
tation of the Printing Act by the English monarch.  Id.  The Printing Act prohibited who 
could publish books and what they could publish.  Id.  Although the Printing Act was short-
lived, the founders of the United States were intent on avoiding a similar situation.  Id. 
167 See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. 397. 
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speech, ensure that the regulation is narrowly tailored, and leave in-
dividuals with alternative channels of communication.168  Hence, the 
balance: an individual’s constitutional right to freedom of speech can 
be outweighed if the government can point to a sufficiently important 






168 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367. 
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